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THE SUPREME COURT'S
MISlEADING FOOTNOTE
IN GENERAl DYNAMICS
by Erik M. Jensen

Erik M. Jensen is Associate Professor of Law at
Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland,
Ohio. This article was written in the course of his
academic pursuits.
In this article, Jensen closely inspects footnote 3
in the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v.
General Dynamics. 'In that case, governed by the
law as it existed before the TRA of 1984, the Court
denied General Dynamics a deduction attributable
to claims for employee medical expenses until the
claims were approved. In the footnote, the Court
suggested that the 1984 amendments to section
461(h) of the Code postponing the time for deducting accrued expenses until economic performance would, in a similar case today, defer General
Dynamics' deduction still further, until time of payment. Jensen argues that the Court was wrong as a
general matter even though its suggestion may
accidentally lead to the right timing result in some
cases. He argues that the Supreme Court misread
the legislative history of section 461 (h) and provided
no theoretical reason for treating economic performance as occurring at the time of payment (rather
than the time services are provided) in the case of
"employee benefit liabilities." Moreover, the Court
ignored the potential effects of other sections of the
Code, such as section 404, which may control the
timing of deductions associated with deferred benefits provided through unfunded medical reimbursement plans.
This article was originally published, in different
form, as part of a longer article in 22 Georgia Law
Review No. 2 (1988) and is reprinted with permission. The author gratefully acknowledges the many
helpful comments made on an earlier draft of this
revised and updated version by Helen B. Jensen,
Esq., and Dale .P. Shrallow, Esq.

Within the past three years, the Supreme Court has
decided two cases dealing with the timing of deductions
by accrual-basis taxpayers. United States v. Hughes
Properties, Inc.,' involving a casino's deduction of the net
increase in its progressive jackpot obligations for the
year, and United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 2
concerning a medical self-insurer's deduction of additions
to its reserve for "incurred but not reported" claims, have
many failings, including misapplication of the "all events"
test and internal inconsistency. 3 This article examines
one specific failing: in footnote 3 of its opinion in General
Dynamics, the Supreme Court misstated changes made
by the Tax Reform Act of 1984 in a way that may lead the ·
unwary reader into major planning mistakes.

The Court ... provided a very misleading impression of the analysis necessary after the
Tax Reform Acts of 1984 and 1986 . ...

Although decided in 1986 and 1987, the cases were
governed by the law as it existed prior to the Tax Reform
Act of 1984. 4 That the Court spent its time on these
controversies is curious in itself. The 1984 Act made
changes, particularly in adding the "economic performance" requirement of Code section 461 (h), that will
affect the analysis, if not always the result, in similar
cases in the future. 5 Whatever the merits of granting the
petitions for certiorari, however, the Court had no reason
to invoke the new statute in its opinions. In footnote 3 of
General Dynamics, the Court did so anyway. It provided
a very misleading impression of the analysis necessary
after the Tax Reform Acts of 1984 and 1986 to determine

u.s. 593 (1986).
S. Ct. 1732 (1987).
The author has examined the cases at length in Jensen, "The
Supreme Court and the Timing of Deductions for Accrual-Basis
Taxpayers," 22 Georgia Law Review 229 (1988).
'The changes affecting timing made by the Tax Reform Act of
1984 are generally effective for deductions that, under prior law,
would have been allowable after July 18, 1984. Pub. L. No. 98369, section 91 (g)(1), 98 Stat. 494, 608.
5 For some ruminations about why the Court might have
granted certiorari in the wake of the statutory changes, see
Jensen, "Hughes Properties and General Dynamics: The Supreme Court, The All Events Test, and the 1984 Tax Act," 32 Tax
Notes 911-12 (1986).
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the timing of deductions associated with "employee benefit liabilities."
This article explains why footnote 3 is at best misleading
and at worst dead wrong. The article first discusses the
applicable law prior to the 1984 Act and describes how
the Supreme Court applied that Jaw in Genera/Dynamics.
Part II describes in generalthe effectof the 1984 Act on
the analysis of the deductibility of future obligations. Part
Ill analyzes footnote 3 of General Dynamics in light of the
theory and legislative history of the 1984 Act. Finally, Part
IV suggests the proper analysis required under present
law to determine the. timing of deductions associated
with an unfunded medical reimbursement plan like that in
General Dynamics.

I. Pre-1984 Act Law
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1984, an accrual-basis
taxpayer was in general required to satisfy the two.
prongs of the regulatory "all events" test in order to
deduct an otherwise accruable liability in the current taxable year. 6 Tile taxpayer had to demonstrate that "all the
events have occurred which determine the fact of the
liability" and that "the amount thereof can be demonstrated with reasonable accuracy." 7 As Hughes Properties
and General Dynamics reached the Supreme Court, both
cases implicated only the first prong of the test, the fact
of liability. a To meet that requirement, a taxpayer had to
prove the absence of contingencies (other than the
obligor's ability to pay) that could defeat the obligation. 9

The Commissioner . .. maintained that the fact
of liability could be established only upon
approval of a claim.

The fact of liability issue in General Dynamics was a
common one. Under collective bargaining agreements,
General Dynamics Corp. was required to provide health
insurance coverage for its employees, and in 1972 it
became a self-insurer. It established reserves to meet its
estimated liability and retained the two insurance firms
that had earlier provided coverage to evaluate and ap-

'This article considers only timing issues-that is, the proper
taxable year for a deduction to be taken. It is assumed that statutory authority (such as IRC sec. 162) exists for any deduction.
'Reg. section 1.461-1 (a)(2) (emphasis added).
'In Hughes Properties, the government had conceded at the
outset the reasonable accuracy of the amount claimed as a
deduction. 476 U.S. at 597. In General Dynamics, while disagreeing with the lower courts' resolution of the amount of liability
issue, the government limited its petition for certiorari to the fact
of liability. See 107 S. Ct. at 1735 n.2.
9 See, e.g., Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193 (1934). Although
the taxpayer must generally show the absence of contingencies,
the test is not read literally to require absolute certainty. Contingencies of some sort always exist until the obligation is actually
fulfilled (such as by payment). The cases have phrased the issue
in terms of the absence of contingencies, but the underlying
question appears to be "How contingent is too contingent?"
See Jensen, "The Deduction of Future Liabilities by AccrualBasis Taxpayers: Premature Accruals, the All Events Test, and
Economic Performance," 37 University of Florida Law Review
443, 455-56 (1985).
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prove benefit claims. On its tax return for 1972, General
Dynamics deducted its liability, as an ordinary and necessary business expense, for medical services assumed to
have been performed durir\g the year.'" It deducted not
only its liability for those employees whose claims had
been approved during the year, but also its estimated
liability for claims during the year that either had not yet
been filed, or, if filed, had not yet been approved. 11
The Commissioner challenged the deductions attributable to those claims that had not been approved by the
end of 1972. He maintained that the fact of liability could
be established~Only upon approval of a claim. Until that
time, no one could be certain that an affected employee
would file a claim or, if a claim was filed, that the plan
administrator would approve reimbursement. 12
General Dynamics prevailed in the lower courts, 13 but
the Supreme Court largely accepted the Commissioner's
position. The Court concluded that the filing of a claim by
an employee is necessary to fix the fact of liability, and
thus General Dynamics had improperly taken deductions
in 1972 with respect to any medical services for which
claims had not been filed by the end of that year. In
addition, General Dynamics lost its 1972 deduction for
claims that had been filed but had not yet been approved
by the end of the year; the company had not created a
record at trial to establish those potentially deductible
amounts. 14
Based on the law prior to the 1984 Act, including the
Supreme Court's decision in General Dynamics, one can
posit five stages in the lifespan of employees' claims
under an employer's self-insurance plan. For estimates
associated with medical services not yet performed and

10
Genera/ Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1734-35. As a "self-insurer,"
General Dynamics took over the obligation to reimburse employees for medical expenses covered under its plans; the
company was therefore providing insurance for its employees.
General Dynamics followed actuarial principles in determining
the amount of its deduction, but it did not claim to be an
"insurance company" entitled for that reason to deduct additions
to reserves. See IRC sec. 807 (permitting deduction for additions
to reserves by life insurance companies); IRC sec. 832(b)(5)
(permitting deduction for additions to reserves by non-life insurance companies). Ct. Brooke, Dirig & Yuhas, "Taxation of HMOs
After Section 461 (h) and General Dynamics," 68 Journal of
Taxation 358 (1988) (suggesting that health maintenance organizations try to qualify as insurance companies in order to deduct
current additions to reserves for incurred but not reported
claims). In fact, from General Dynamics' perspective, although
the new arrangement was called "self-insurance," it was technically not insurance at all. General Dynamics was shifting none of
its own risk to another, unrelated party. See Barker, "Federal income Taxation and Captive Insurance," 6 Virginia Tax Review
267, 280 (1986).
"General Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1734-35. On its original
return, General Dynamics deducted no part of the self-insurance
reserves. However, upon commencement of an Internal Revenue
Service audit, the company filed an amended return claiming
entitlement to a deduction for the additions to the reserves. /d. at
1735.
"See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, General Dynamics
(No. 85-1385).
13
General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 250
(1984), aff'd, 773 F.2d 1224 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
"General Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1737. The Court noted the
general proposition that the taxpayer must show its entitlement
to a deduction, citing Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507, 514
(1935). General Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1737.
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claims therefore not yet filed, General Dynamics took no
deductions, consistent with the common understanding
of the all events test. With respect to medical services
performed but claims not filed, General Dynamics had
taken deductions-unsuccessfully, as it turned out, under
the Supreme Court's decision. For additions to reserves
associated with claims filed but not yet approved, the
government had argued that no deduction was permissible, but the company apparently would have prevailed if
it had proven the amount attributable to such claims. For
approved but unpaid claims, there was no dispute about
deductibility. Finally, a fortiori, paid (and previously undeducted) claims were currently deductible.

cost of the liabilities to which the deductions related-socalled "premature accruals."''
Consider a taxpayer that has a present, fixed liability to
pay $100 in five years for an otherwise deductible expense. Assume that both prongs of the all events test
have been satisfied. If no other statutory barrier intervened, the taxpayer could deduct the entire $100 currently, without any discounting to reflect the time value of
money. However, a current deduction equals the cost of
the liability only if the taxpayer is limited to the present
value of the future obligation, 23 and no Code provision or
judicial decision has limited a taxpayer to a discounted
deduction in such circumstances. 24

II. TRA of 1984
In the 1984 Act, Congress significantly changed the
rules governing the timing of deductions by accrualbasis taxpayers. While retaining the all events test, and
elevating it from the regulations to the Code, 15 section
461 (h) requires that a deduction generally be taken no
earlier than "economic performance." 16 As a result, to be
entitled in the current taxable year to deduct an obligation
payable in the future, a taxpayer must now demonstrate
not only the fact and the amount of the liability, the two
traditional components of the all events test, but also the
occurrence of economic performance.
The nature of the transaction determines the time when
economic performance is deemed to occur. For example,
economic performance attributable to an obligation to
provide or pay for property or services occurs only as the
property or services are provided. 17 Economic performance with respect to a liability arising either under a
worker's compensation statute or out of a tort occurs
only as payment is made to another person. 18 The Secretary of the Treasury is given authority to provide exceptions to these rules 19 and also to define economic performance for cases not specifically covered by the
statute. 20
Section 461 (h) generally operates to defer deductions
beyond the time that they could have been taken under
pre-1984 Act law. 21 Indeed, the section was added to the
Code because of the congressional perception that, under
the historical all events test, accrual-basis taxpayers had
been able to generate deductions that exceeded the true

15 IRC sec. 461 (h) (4) follows the language of the regulations:
"the all events test is met with respect to any item if all events
have occurred which determine the fact of liability and the
amount of such liability can be determined with reasonable
accuracy."
'siRC sec:461(h)(1).
11 IRC sees. 461 (h)(2)(A). 461 (h)(2)(B).
18 IRC sec. 461 (h)(2)(C).
19 IRC sec. 461 (h)(2) (introductory language states "[e]xcept
as provided in regulations prescribed by the Secretary").
' 0 IRC sec. 461 (h)(2)(D).
21 See Bowers & Stone, "Some Items Still Deductible Under AllEvents Test Despite New Economic Performance Rules," 64
Journal of Taxation 354, 354 (1986). Because it adds a requirement to the all events test, section 461 (h) of course cannot result
in deductions earlier than permitted under pre-1984 Act law. If
the all events test and the economic performance requirement
are satisfied simultaneously, the time of deduction is the same
whether pre- or post-1984 Act law governs.
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The taxpayer could deduct the entire [amount]
... without any discounting to reflect the time
value of money.

Under section 461 (h), if the future liability is associated
with the provision of property or services, and if the
property or services are provided in year five, the $100
will not be deductible until that time. The deduction and
the true cost of the obligation will, in this example, be
perfectly meshed at the later date: "Economically, a
present deduction of the present value [of an obligation
payable in the future] is equivalent to a future deduction

22 See H.R. Rept. No. 432, 98th Gong., 2d Sess. 1254 (1984) [the
1984 House Report]; Staff of Senate Finance Committee, 98th
Gong., 2d Sess., Deficit Reduction Tax Bill of 1984 Explanation
of Provisions Approved by the Committee on March 21, 1984, at
271 (1984) [the 1984 Senate Report]; Staff of Joint Committee on
Taxation, 98th Gong., 2d Sess., General Explanation of the
Revenue Provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, at 260
(Comm. Print 1984) [the 1984 Blue Book].
23 The present value of that future obligation, using a discount
rate of five percent compounded semiannually, is $78.12. That
is, if the taxpayer invested $78.12 today at a five percent after-tax
rate of return, it would have the $100 in five years necessary to
satisfy the liability. Other authors have posited extreme cases
that produce "cost-free" liabilities, where the tax savings from
the accelerated deduction equals or exceeds the true cost of the
liability. See, e.g., McGown, "Structured Settlements: Deduct
Now and Pay Later," 60 TAXES- The Tax Magazine 251,251-53
(1982).
"See Burnham Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. No. 62 (1988)
(noting lack of authority); Sheppard, "Economic Nonperformance: Doing Without Section 461 (h) Regulations," 40 Tax
Notes 337, 338-39 (1988) (discussing Burnham Corp.). Commentators have suggested the appropriateness of such discounting
for accrual-basis taxpayers. See, e.g., Aidinoff & Lopata, "Section
461 and Accrual-Method Taxpayers: The Treatment of Liabilities
Arising from Obligations to be Performed in the Future," 33 Tax
Lawyer789, 811-23 (1980).
Discounting of present deductions (rather than deferral of
undiscounted deductions) is required only in certain very specialized areas. For example, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 requires
that the deduction available to non-life insurance companies for
"unpaid losses" be discounted to present value. See IRC sec.
832(b)(5), as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-514, sec. 1022(a). 100 Stat. 2085, 2397-99; IRC sec. 1023(c).
100 Stat. 2085, 2399-2404.
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of th!il future value." 25 The statute is not perfect-in some
circumstances it still permits a taxpayer who is obligated
to make a future payment to take an undiscounted deduction in a year before the payment is made 26 -but it is a
decided improvement over pre-1984 Act law.

Section 461(h) is undoubtedly an impediment
[to] . .. the tax planner, who generally wants to
accelerate deductions . ...

From the standpoint of the tax planner, who generally
wants to accelerate deductions, section 461 (h) is undoubtedly an impediment. In addition, because its application in many cases may be inconsistent with generally
accepted accounting principles, the economic performance standard increases -bookkeeping requirements.·
Recognizing this fact, Congress provided a potentially
important exception to the economic performance requirement for "certain recurring items." A liability is
considered as incurred within a taxable year, even though
economic performance has not occurred in that year, if
four conditions are met:
l. The all events test, applied without an economic
performance requirement, is satisfied;
2. Economic performance in fact occurs within a reasonable period after the close of the taxable year (and in
no event any later than B'h months after such close);
3. The item is recurring and the taxpayer's treatment is
consistent from year to year; and
4. Either the item is not a material item or accrual in the
taxable year results in a "more proper" matching of
expenses and income than would accrual in a later year. 27
The relief provided by the "recurring items" exception
is more apparent than real, however. The exception
contains many ambiguities, and, as critics have noted,
"[l]n many if not most of the cases, it will be difficult to
determine if the exception is available." 28 The materialitymatching alternative in the fourth requirement is hardly
self-defining in its application. And how should the second requirement, the B'h month test, be applied to a set of
facts where there is generally, but not always, performance within the short period? in a case like General
Dynamics, for example, should compliance with the test

"Bradley & Winslow, "Self-Insurance Plans and Captive Insurance Companies-A Perspective on Recent Tax Developments,"
4 American Journal of Tax Policy 217, 233 (1985) (footnote
omitted); see Gunn, "Matching of Costs and Revenues as a Goal
of Tax Accounting," 4 Virginia Tax Review 1, 31 n.144 (1984).
2
'11 the taxpayer in the example receives services (and therefore
economic performance occurs) in year five but pays the $100 for
the services in year six, the taxpayer may still receive the
economic benefit of a deduction that is one year premature
under the new statute. The present value in year five of the
obligation to pay $100 in year six is $95.18, using a discount rate
of five percent compounded semiannually. Ct. note 23, supra.
However, if lAC sec. 461 (h) is applicable, and no other timing
rule (such as lAC sec. 83(h) or lAC sec. 404(a)(5)) overrides the
effect of that section, nothing precludes the taxpayer's taking a
deduction for the full $100 in year five.
21 1RC sec. 461 (h)(3)(A).
25
Bowers & Stone, supra note 21, at 356.
668

be measured on an aggregate basis or by use of a claimby-claim analysis? 29
Ill. Footnote 3
The economic performance requirement did not apply
in either Hughes Properties or General Dynamics. 30 At
the time the Court was considering Hughes Properties,
decided in June 1986, the Justices may not even have
been aware that the statutory changes could affect the
analysis of similar cases in the future. 31
By the time of its decision in General Dynamics less
than 11 months later, the Court had become aware that
the statute had changed and that future cases would not
be analyzed under the principles of General Dynamics
alone. Indeed, in footnote 3, the Court not only let us
know that it had become informed that recent legislative
developments had occurred, 32 it also hinted at the effect
of those changes: .
We do not address how this case would be decided
under section 461 (h), but note that the legislative
history of the Act indicates that, "[i]n the case
of ... employee benefit liabilities, which require a
payment by the taxpayer to another person, economic performance occurs as the payments to such
person are made."33

The Court . .. did precisely what it purported
not to do: to suggest the resolution . .. under
the new statute.

Thus, the Court in one sentence did precisely what it
purported not to do: to suggest the resolution of a similar
case under the new statute.
Some readers of the opinion immediately took the
footnote at face value, as if it resolved any ambiguity that
might otherwise have existed. 34 Tax planners should not
rely on the Supreme Court for tax research, however. The
Court's gratuitous suggestion does not stand up to scrutiny, It has no theoretical basis, and it is an embarrassing
misreading of legislative history.
Consider two economically similar cases. If Able performs services for Baker, economic performance is
deemed to occur with the performance of those services.
Thus, if the all events test is otherwise met by that time,
Baker is then entitled to a deduction. If, however, Able
performs services for an employee of Baker, and Baker is

29See notes 75-80, infra, and accompanying text (discussing
similar issue under lAC sec. 404).
30 See note 4, supra· (effective date of changes made by 1984
Act); see also General Dynamics, 107 S. Ct. at 1735-36 n.3.
31 See Jensen, supra note 5, at 911-12.
32 1suspect that is one of the reasons for the footnote.
33 107 S. Ct. at 1736 n.3 (quoting 1984 House Report at 1255,
and citing H.R. Rept. No. 861, 98th Gong., 2d Sess. 872 (1984)
(conference committee explanation of House bill) [the 1984
Conference Report].
34 Among the misled were the preparers of the Newsletter of
the American Bar Association's Section of Taxation. See 6 Section of Taxation Newsletter 62-63 {1987).
TAX NOTES, November 7, 1988
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obligated to pay for the services, the Court suggests that
economic performance occurs only when payment is
made. From the standpoint of Baker, the party for whom
services are being performed directly or indirectly, is
there any principle that justifies a different result in the
timing of deductions?
Delay of the deduction until payment is consistent with
the theory that should have governed section 461 (h);
such a rule would eliminate premature accruals. 35 That
theory, however, is not uniformly reflected in the definitions of economic performance. The statute by its terms
permits the deduction of many liabilities before payment
occurs, 36 and there is nothing obviously peculiar about
services provided in connection with "employee benefit
liabilities" that justifies treatment different from the provision of services generally. 37
In addition, the language of section 461 (h) contains no
suggestion that medical self-insurance plans should be
governed by any principle other than that applicable Jo
"services ... provided to the taxpayer"; that is, economic
performance occurs as services are performed. 36 The

35 See note 26, supra, and accompanying text.
35 See notes 17-20, supra, and accompanying text. Under the
statute, economic performance is defined as occurring on payment only with respect to worker's compensation and tort
liabilities. IRC sec. 461 (h) (2)(C).
37 lf there are hidden peculiarities that should have controlling
effect, the Court did not enlighten us about them. Two possibilities come to mind, but neither persuasively requires reading a
payment requirement into the statute.
First, in the employee reimbursement situation, it is unclear
from the statutory language whose services are relevant-that is,
whether the analytical focus should be on the medical services
or on the employee's services to the employer. See W. Klein, B.
Bittker & L. Stone, Federal Income Taxation 437 (7th ed. 1987)
(assuming performance of medical services is controlling). But
see note 46, infra, and accompanying text (1984 Conference
Report suggesting economic performance occurs as the employee performs services). Whatever uncertainty may exist on
this point, however, it provides no reason to delay the deduction
until a still later time, the time of payment. Moreover, the
uncertainty will have little practical effect because the two types
of services are in nearly all cases provided simultaneously. The
medical services are provided to an employee (or family member
of an employee) during that person's employment.
Second, in some employer-employee cases, concern may
arise that the employer's deduction precedes inclusion of income by the employee. Several Code provisions seek to ensure
"inter-taxpayer matching," deferring a deduction until a corresponding inclusion occurs. See, e.g., IRC sec. 83(h) (deferring
deduction attributable to compensation-related transfer of property until amount is included in gross income of service-provider). With a plan like that in General Dynamics, however, intertaxpayer matching cannot be effected if the employer is to be
entitled to a deduction: the reimbursement of the medical
expenses is generally excludable from the gross income of the
employees. See IRC sec. 105(b). But see IRC sec. 89 (new provision denying exclusion of benefits to highly compensated employees if benefit plan is discriminatory).
JBIRC sec. 461 (h)(2)(A) provides:
If the liability of the taxpayer arises out of(i) the providing of services to the taxpayer by another
person, economic performance occurs as such person
provides such services,
(ii) the providing of property to the taxpayer by another
person, economic performance occurs as the person
provides such property, or
(iii) the use of the property by the taxpayer, economic
performance occurs as the taxpayer uses such property.

TAX NOTES, November 7, 1988

government could argue that the medical services (assuming those are the critical services for analytical purposes39) are not being provided to the "taxpayer," a selfinsured employer like General Dynamics, but such an
argument is formalistic at best. If the services are provided
at a taxpayer's expense pursuant to a contract between
the taxpayer and its employees, they are being provided
for the indirect benefit of the taxpayer-employer.

The language that the Court quoted . .. applied
to a version of the 1984/egislation that was not
enacted.
This leaves no theoretical basis for distinguishing the
two hypothetical cases involving services, and the Court's
suggestion about the effect of section 461 (h) is therefore
suspect. It is perhaps unfair to chastise the Court for not
providing a justification grounded in theory on an issue
that the Court purported not to have addressed. But the
failure on this point goes beyond lack of theoretical
sophistication. The language that the Court quoted from
the legislative history applied to a version of the 1984
legislation that was not enacted. Any lawyer who deals
with statutes knows that one must examine interpretive
passages in a congressional committee report in light of
the language that the report is interpreting; we should
expect no less from the Justices and clerks of the United
States Supreme Court.
The full language of the committee report, without the
Court's artful ellipsis, provides that, "[i]n the case of
worker's compensation, tort, and employee benefit liabilities, which require a payment by the taxpayer to another
person, economic performance occurs as the payments
to such person are made." 40 That passage interprets
language in the House bill that said precisely the same
thing-language applying to the three named categories
of liabilities.'' 'But that language did not survive the
legislative process intact. At some point in the HouseSenate conference committee deliberations, the bill's
reference to "employee benefit liabilities" was deleted. 42
The Code section as enacted treats "payment" as the
event of economic performance only for worker's compensation and tort liabilitiesY If "payment" is to constitute

39 See note 37, supra.
40 1984 House Report at 1255.
"H.R. 4170, 98th Gong., 2d Sess., sec. 91 (a). reprinted in 1984
House Report. In the bill, employee benefits subject to the rules
of sections 404 (dealing with certain deferred compensation
plans). 404A (dealing with foreign deferred compensation plans),
and 419 (dealing with defined welfare benefit funds) were
excepted from the economic performance rules of proposed
section 461 (h).
"The Senate bill was similar to the House version, defining
economic performance as payment to another person for the
same three named categories of liabilities. That bill included the
same exceptions (see note 41, supra) and added another: if
payments were made within 2% months after the close of the
taxable year, the special rule for "employee benefit liabilities"
was not to apply. Thus, in such a case, economic performance
would be defined as the time of services, not the time of
payment. S. 2062, 98th Gong., 2d Sess., sec. 71 (a), reprinted in
1984 Senate Report.
4
3IRC sec. 461 (h)(2)(C).
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economic performance in other circumstances, it is only
because regulations have so provided.4 4
The conference committee report does not explain why
the statutory reference to "employee benefit liabilities"
was dropped. The Supreme Court may be right in implying that economic performance and hence deduction in
such cases should await payment, but that is a peculiar
inference to draw from Congress' deletion. of a phrase
that would have unequivocally secured that result. 45 And
the conference committee suggested that economic performance may occur prior to (or simultaneously with) the
provision of medical services: "economic performance
with respect to a liability to an employee generally occurs
as the employee renders his or her services." 46
We can on I~ speculate about the reason for the deletion
of the bill's reference to "employee benefit liabilities."

44 See notes 19-20, supra, and accompanying text. The implica- ·
lion of this scheme is that for those events specifically addressed
in the statute, such as the provision of services, regulations
should redefine the time of economic performance only in
special circumstances.
45
See notes 51-80, infra, and accompanying text (suggesting
proper post-1984 Act analysis). It is true that deferral of a deduction until payment would eliminate the premature accrual effect.
See note 26, supra, andaccompanying text. It is also true that,
when there is substantial doubt about the time of economic
performance, the legislative language should be interpreted in .a
way that reduces premature accruals. But the Court was making
no argument about the proper method of interpretation in a
world of uncertainty; it merely quoted language from a questionably relevant committee report.
"1 984 Conference Report at 877 (emphasis added). The
Supreme Court had cited to the conference committee report
(see note 33, supra) as if that report supported its suggestive
nonsuggestion about "employee benefit liabilities." However,
the page citation is to the conference committee's description of
the House bill, not to a discussion of the committee's own
product. 1984 Conference Report at 872.
The 1984 Blue Book gives support to the Supreme Court's
implication: "Economic performance with respect to employee
benefits (other than compensation) occurs generally when the
employer mal<es a payment under the benefit plan (rather than
when the services are rendered)." 1984 Blue Book at 267. If this
language is intended to explain section 461 (h), however, its
statutory underpinnings are obscure.
Perhaps the 1984 Blue Book language merely means that
other statutory sections, such as IRC sec. 404 (see notes 53-80,
infra, and accompanying text) may often defer deductions until
payment and thus may have the· effect of preempting section
461 (h). So interpreted, the language would be less objectionable. However, an example provided in the Blue Book suggests
that the Joint Committee staff intended the language to mean
precisely what it says about the time of economic performance.
See the 1984 Blue Book at 267 (contribution to trust under
funded welfare benefit plan that, because of effective date of IRC
sec. 419, was not governed by that section, said to be deductible
only at time of payment under IRC sec. 461 (h)). See note 53,
intra (describing effect of IRC sec. 419).
If the Blue Book language was intended to explain section
461, as it apparently was, it should be given little interpretive
weight since it is arguably contrary to the conference committee
report. Cf. Bank of Clearwater v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 289,
2984 (1 985) (emphasis added):

II is this court's view that, although said Joint Committee
Explanation prepared by the staff does not rise to the level
of authority given to legislative history, we do not perceive
it as totally worthless or unenlightening. It is common
knowledge that the congressional staff of the Joint Com(Footnote 46 continued
on next column.)
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One possibility is that the conference committee determined such a liability is likely to have a sufficiently short
"tail," the time between accrual and payment, that the
economic benefit from an accelerated deduction is within
acceptable limits." In contrast, because they may be
discharged in installments over extended periods of time,
worker's compensation and tort liabilities are precisely
the kind of potentially abusive liabilities that most concerned many commentators.4"
Another possible explanation, tor which there is a great
deal of circumstantial evidence, is that the committee
concluded no special reference to "employee benefit
liabilities" is necessary in section 461 (h) because the
timing effect of such liabilities is generally to be determined under other statutory provisions. 49 Indeed, the
conference committee note'd that "an employer's deduc-

(Footnote 46 continued.)
mittee works very closely with the members of Congress
in drafting legislation and undoubtedly has "eyeball knowledge" of the fundamental legislative purpose of a given
piece of legislation. Abserit any definitive legislative history
that is more revealing, the court believes it is proper
nonetheless, in the absence of any comparable contrary
assertions, to give substantial weight to this Explanation.
At the very least, it should receive no less recognition than
a thesis of a text writer ori a given point.
The Blue Book is a staff-prepared report, not reviewed by either
congressional tax committee. It merely reflects the staff's understanding of congressional intent. See Staff of Joint Committee
on Taxation, General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1976,
at Ill (Comm. Print 1976).
47
Congress' views about what constitutes an acceptably short
tail are evolving, as the change in the treatment of vested
vacation pay demonstrates. The 1984 Act contained a specific
provision limiting an employer's current deduction for vacation
pay earned during the taxable year to amounts paid within 8%
months of that year's end. See I RC sec. 463(a). prior to repeal by
Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, sec. 10201 (a), 101
Stat: 1330-382, 1330-387; cf. note 27, supra, and accompanying
text (8% month requirement of "recurring items" exception).
However, by repealing section 463 (and making conforming
changes elsewhere in the Code), Congress in the 1987 Act
effectively reduced the critical period for vacation pay to 2%
months after the end of the year in which it was earned. See H.R.
Rep!. No. 495, 100 Cong., 1st Sess. 921 (1987) [the 1987
Conference Report].
'"See Bradley & Winslow, supra note 25, at 232. In Rev. Rul.
69-429, 1969-2 C.B. 108, the Service had ruled that, in the case of
a worker's compensation settlement award to be paid in installments over several years, a self-insured employer could deduct
the total undiscounted amount of the future awards in the year
of settlement. (For example, if the obligation were to pay $1,000
per year for 10 years, the employer could currently deduct the
full $10,000, rather than the present value of the future stream of
payments.) Imaginative planners urged the use of this principle
in structuring tort settlements as well. See McGown, supra note
23, at 252-53. In certain extreme cases, it was possible to
structure a settlement that, because of the value of the current,
undiscounted tax deduction, provided an overall economic benefit to the payor. In response to one such example, Professor
Gunn remarked, "If this is the law [prior to the 1984 Act]. welladvised accrual-method businesses should cancel their liability
insurance and run down pedestrians at the rate of at least one a
year." Gunn, supra note 25, at 26.
49
The Supreme Court's quotation from the House Report
assumed, however, that IRC sec. 461 (h) was to be the controlling
provision. See text accompanying note 33, supra.
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tion for compensation or other benefits paid to an employee in a year subsequent to economic performance is
subject to the rules in the Code ... governing deferred
compensation, deferred benefits, and funded welfare
benefit plans." 50 The committee suggested, that is, that
even though economic performance is deemed to occur
as the employee performs his services (subject, of course,
to the Treasury's power to change the rules), other
sections may require deferral of the employer's deduction beyond the time of economic performance.
In Part IV, this article attempts to locate the analysis of
employee benefit liabilities like those at issue in General
Dynamics within the new statutory scheme. As we shall
see, footnote 3 is not helpful in that process.

The analysis of employee benefit liabilities is
enormously complex.
IV. Unfunded Medical Reimbursement Plans
The analysis of employee benefit liabilities is enormously complex. 51 Merely locating the proper analytical
starting point in the Code for a particular liability can
confuse thevery best lawyers. 52 This article cannot provide the definitive treatise on the deductibility of amounts
related to unfunded medical reimbursement plans; it is
enough for present purposes to demonstrate that the
Supreme Court's suggestion about post-1984 Act law is
misleading. For those lawyers educated about employee
benefits, the Court has added confusion to an already
confused area. For inexperienced lawyers, the Court
applied a veneer of simplicity to an area that is decidedly
not simple.
A. Unfunded Plans Providing Deferred Benefits
If a medical reimbursement plan is unfunded, 53 and if
the plan provides "deferred benefits," then, under section

•

50 1984 Conference Report at 877. Accordingly, since employee
benefit liabilities are not included in the rule defining economic
performance as payment, the House and Senate bills' references
to sections 404, 404A. and 419 as exceptions to that rule were
unnecessary. See notes 41-42, supra.
51 Part IV of this article can only suggest the necessary .complexity. The analysis of medical reimbursement plans provided
here assumes the inapplicability of IRC sec. 83(h}, which applies
to compensation-related transfers of "property," not including
money, Reg. section 1.83-3(e}; and IRC sec. 404A, dealing with
certain foreign deferred compensation plans. An employee benefits lawyer must of course be familiar with these sections as well
as the complex provisions governing qualified benefit plans.
52 The autho~ has seen such issues discussed by major law
firms in. memoranda that ignore the effects of some of the
potentially crucial Code sections. See also W. Klein, B. Bittker &
L. Stone, supra note 37, at 437 (ignoring IRC sec. 404}.
53 "Unfunded" means, for this purpose, that the reimbursement
obligation will be discharged through the use of the employer's
general funds. The employer has taken no steps to segregate
assets (through separate trusts, bank accounts, and so on} to
meet the obligation.
Despite the "unfunded" nomenclature, we would have to
assure ourselves that the arrangement did not constitute a
"funded welfare benefit plan" governed by IRC sec. 419. IRC
sec. 419 and its companion provision, IRC sec. 419A (dealing
with qualified asset accounts}, were added to the Code by the
Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, sec. 511 (a}. 98 Stat.
(Footnote 53 continued
on next column.)
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404, 54 the employer may deduct otherwise deductible 55
amounts only as they are includable in the gross income
of employees (or as they would be includable were it not
(Footnote 53 continued.)
494, 854-61, and were amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-514, sec. 1851, 100 Stat. 2085, 2858-63. If section
419 did apply, the employer would effectively be put on a cash
basis, with contributions deductible (subject to some limitations} only as paid to a "welfare benefit fund."
A "welfare benefit fund" is a "fund which ... is part of a plan of
an employer, and ... through which the employer provides welfare benefits to employees or their beneficiaries." IRC sec.
419(e}(1 }. "Welfare benefits," in general, are all benefits other
than those governed by IRC sec. 83(h}, IRC sec. 404, or IRC sec.
404A. IRC sec. 419(e}(2); see note 41, supra (describing other
cited Code sections}.
Without a segregated account or fund created specifically to
cover the plan's obligations, a reimbursement plan should avoid
the application of IRC sec. 419. A "fund" is in general defined as
one of several enumerated tax-exempt organizations; a trust,
corporation, or other taxable entity; and, "to the extent provided
in regulations, any account held for an employer by any person."
IRC sec. 419(e}(3). The legislative history provides some guidance on what constitutes a "fund."
In prescribing regulations relating to the definition of the
term "fund," the conferees wish to emphasize that the
principal purpose of this provision ... is to prevent employers from taking premature deductions, for expenses
which have not yet been incurred, by interposing an
intermediary organization which holds assets which are
used to provide benefits to the employees of the employer.
1984 Conference Report at 1155. The House Report indicated in
a footnote, however, that "employer contributions to a separate
bank account of the employer or to a subsidiary or other related
party would not be considered contributions to a fund." 1984
House Report at 1280 n.18.
The analysis can be particularly confusing, and the possibility
of application of IRC sec. 419 therefore correspondingly greater,
if the employer interposes a third party administrator, such as an
insurance company, for the plan. Temporary regulations have
provided:
[l]f an employer makes a payment to an insurance company under an "administrative services only" arrangement
with respect to which the life insurance company maintains a separate account to provide benefits, then the
arrangement would be considered to be a "fund."
Temp. Reg. sec. 1.419-1 T, A-3(c}. But see Announcement 86-45,
1986-15 I.R.S. 52 (clarifying arrangements with insurance companies that will be classified as "funds"}.
54 IRC sec. 404 was modified in both 1984 and 1986. The most
noteworthy modification for present purposes was the addition
of IRC sec. 404(b}(2). See note 56, infra. Tax Reform Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-369, sec. 512(a}. 98 Stat. 494, 862-63.
55 IRC sec. 404(a} provides, in relevant part, that
if compensation is paid or accrued on account of any employee under a plan deferring the receipt of such compensation, such ... compensation shall not be deductible under this chapter; but, if they [sic] would otherwise be
deductible, they [sic] shall be deductible under thissection, subject, however, to the following limitations as to
the amounts deductible in any year.
(Emphasis added.} Among the specified limitations is that of IRC
sec. 404(a}(5}. See note 56, infra.
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, IRC sec. 404(a} required
that the deductions be otherwise available under either IRC sec.
162 or sec. 212. The 1986 Act substituted the less restrictive
"otherwise be deductible" language. Pub. L. No. 99-514, sec.
1851(b}(2}(C}(i}, 100 Stat. 2085,2863.
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for a statutory exclusion). 56 The requirement that the
amount "otherwise be deductible" means not only that
the expense must be an ordinary and necessary business
expense (or have another statutory basis for deduction),
but also that the statutory timing requirements must be
met. 57 By its terms, section 404 acts only as a deferral
provision: wh,en the threshold all events test, as modified
by the economic performance requirement, has been
satisfied, the employer must consider whether section
404 requires still further deferral.
Integrating these statutory pieces-the all events test,
the economic performance requirement, and section404in a simple example may be helpful. Assume that an employee performed services for an accrual-basis employer
in 1987, received medical services and filed a claim for
reimburseme-nt in 1987, and is reimbursed for his medical
costs under his employer's unfunded plan in 1988. Assume also that both the employer and employee have a
calendar-year taxable year_ The General Dynamics Court
said the all events test is satisfied upon filing a claim for
reimbursement-here 1987 (if the reasonable accuracy
requirement is met at that time 58 ). Under section 461 (h),
prior to any regulatory modification, economic performance is apparently deemed to have occurred as the employee performed his services, also in 1987. 59 But absent
a statutory exclusion rule, the employee, as a cash-basis
taxpayer, would have to include the reimbursed amounts

"IRC sec. 404(b)(2), as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-369, sec. 512(a), 98 Stat. 494, 862-63, requires
treating "any plan providing for deferred benefits (other than
compensation) for employees ... as a plan deferring the receipt
of compensation"-thus subject to the timing rules of IRC sec.
404(a)-and IRC sec. 404(b)(1) includes in the category of
"plan" for this purpose any method or arrangement having the
effect of plan. IRC sec. 404(a)(5) in general requires deferring
the deduction for an unfunded plan until "the taxable year in
which an amount attributable to the contribution is includable in
the gross income of employees participating in the plan." In
determining timing, it is irrelevant that medical reimbursement
would generally be excludable from the gross income of employees. See note 37, supra. IRC sec. 404(b)(2) (A).
Like the economic performance rules, IRC sec. 404(b)(2), as
amended, is generally effective after July 18, 1984, the date of
enactment of the 1984 Act. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-369, sec. 512(c), 98 Stat. 494, 863; Temp. Reg. sec. 1.404(b)1T, A-3.
The analysis undertaken here is of reimbursement plans for
employees, but IRC sec. 404(d) in general applies the same
timing rules to deferred compensation and deferred benefits
provided to independent contractors.
''Temp. Reg. sec. 1.461 (h)-4T (1986) provides that, "[i]n the
case of an accrual method taxpayer, a contribution or compensation satisfies the requirements of sections 162 or 212 [i.e., is
deemed to "otherwise be deductible," see note 55, supra (1986
Act change in language of IRC sec. 404(a))] only to the extent
that the all events test ... and the economic performance requirement. .. are satisfied."
58
The government had challenged the reasonable accuracy of
General Dynamics' claimed deduction in the lower courts because the deduction exceeded the amount later paid for claims
by nearly 20 percent. The government was unsuccessful, however, see General Dynamics, 6 Cl. Ct. at 256; 773 F.2d at 1226,
and it did not raise the issue in its petition for certiorari. See note
8, supra.
59
See note 46, supra, and accompanying text.
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in income as received, in 1988. If this plan is a deferred
benefit plan-and from a common sense standpoint it
is 60 -section 404 requires deferring the employer's deduction until1988, the year of payment, despite apparent
compliance with section 461 (h) in 1987.
The conclusion that 1988 is the appropriate year of deduction is reinforced by another consideration. Notwithstanding the suggestion in the legislative history, 61 the
economic performance requirement will not have been
met in 1987. Under its statutory authority to modify section 461 (h) definitions, 5 2 the Treasury has issued temporary regulations defining economic performance, in the
case of a deferred benefit that is governed by section 404
and that is received by a cash-basis taxpayer, as the time
of payment. 63

The Supreme Court's suggestion . . . appears to
be . .. accidentally right . ...

The analysis has come full circle. Economic performance, according to the temporary regulations, is payment. The Supreme Court's suggestion in General Dynamics that the employer's deduction must await the year
of payment therefore appears to be right-accidentally
right, to be sure, but right nonetheless. 64 So interpreted,
the economic performance requirement merely leads to a
result that section 404 would have provided anyway. Note
also that, if section 404 applies, the "recurring items"
exception to the economic performance requirement
makes no difference in the result. 5 5 At least one commentator has suggested that the exception should apply to
medical reimbursement plans. 66 Even if that is correctand it is not at all clear67 -section 404 should still defer
the deduction until the time of paymentfor any deferred
benefit.
Why should we care that the Supreme Court cited an .
irrelevant piece of legislative history if the citation points
us in the right direction? Section B discusses that question.

60
lt provides a deferred benefit in that the employee performed
the services in 1987 but receives the benefit, the reimbursement,
in 1988.
"'See note 46, supra, and accompanying text. ·
"See note 19, supra, and accompanying text.
63
ln the case of a contribution or compensation subject to
section 404 ... , pursuant to the authority under section
461 (h)(2), economic performance occurs ... in the case of
a plan subject to section 404, either as the contribution is
made under the plan or, if section 404(a)(5) is applicable,
as an amount attributable to such contribution is includible in the gross income of an employee.

Temp. Reg. sec. 1.461(h)-4T, A-1 (1986).
64
The temporary regulations were promulgated on January 29,
1986, in T.D. 8073, 1986-1 C.B. 42, and thus were available long
before the Supreme Court's decision in General Dynamics. A
citation to these regulations would have been more helpful to
readers than the Court's citation to the House Report.
65
See notes 27-29, supra, and accompanying text.
66 See Note, "Tightening the Prongs on the 'All Events' Test:
United States v. General Dynamics Corp.," 41 Tax Lawyer 523,
538 (1988).
"See text accompanying note 28, supra.
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Table 1

"

Deductibility of Claims for Medical Services Performed in 1987
(1)

(2)

Filing of Claim
(All Events
Test Met)'

Payment of
Claim

(3)
Deferred
Benefit?
(Sec. 404
Apply?)

1987

Before 3/16/88

No

(4)

(5)

Economic Performance
(If Not a
'Recurring Item')'

Year of Deduction 3

1987 (services)

1987 (All events test and economic performance have
occurred; sec. 404 does not apply)

1987

After 3/15/88

Yes'

1988 (payment)

1988 (Sec. 404 controls)

1988

Before 3/1B/88

No

1987 (services)

1988 (All events test not met until filing)

1988

After 3/15/88

Yes'

1988 (payment)

1988 (Sec. 404 controls)

•Assuming amount of liability prong is satisfied.
'If "recurring items" exception is applicable, the unmodified economic performance requirement does not apply.
'Whether or not "recurring items" exception applies.
'Assuming presumption that payments were made more than "brief period" after end of year cannot be rebutted.

B. What Are Deferred Benefits?
As convoluted as the above statutory analysis may
seem, the real world is even more complex. We should
care about the Court's sloppiness because the Court may
well not have pointed us in the fight direction. A more
detailed statutory map is necessary, and some of the
terrain is yet to be charted. The above analysis was
premised on the assumption that a medical reimbursement plan is necessarily a deferred benefit plan. 68 However, under the temporary regulations, and with support
in the legislative history, 69 benefits are treated as deferred
only if they are received more than a "brief period of
time" after the end of the employer's taxable year, 70 and a
plan is presumed to defer benefits for more than a brief
period only if they are received more than 2'h months
after the close of that year. 71

••see Accounting_ Periods and Methods, Para. 203.031, at 370
(CCH Tax Transactions Library) (T.J. Purcell ed. 1987) (apparently assuming that medical reimbursement plans are governed by deferred benefit rules).
"[T]he conferees intend that payment of bonuses or other
amounts within 2'12 months after the close of the taxable
year in which significant services required for payment
have been performed is not to be considered a deferred
compensation or deferred benefit plan.

•

1984 Conference Report at 1160. See also 1984 House Report at
1284 ("brief period" rule); 1984 Blue Book at 805 (to same
effect). The Senate version of the bill would have codified the 2%
month standard. See note 42, supra.
70Temp. Reg. sec. 1.404(b)-1T, A-2(a) (1986).
71 Temp. Reg. sec. 1.404(b)-1T, A-2(b)(1) (1986). The regulatory
2'h month rule, first alluded to in legislative language later
dropped (see note 42, supra), overturned the prior position of
the Internal Revenue Service, under which a plan was treated as
a deferred compensation or deferred benefit plan only if it
deferred a payment for more than 12 months after the close of
the taxable year in which the employer incurred a liability under
the plan. See, e.g., LTR 82-06-169 (Nov. 17, 1981); L TR 80-06067 (Nov. 19, 1979) (citing New York Seven-Up Bottling Co. v.
Commissioner, 50 T.C. 391 (1968) (severance pay plan held to
be deferred compensation plan where it provided employees
terminating after more than five years' continuous serl!ice with
one week's pay for each year of service); and Lundy Packing Co.
v. United States, 302 F. Supp. 182 (C.D.N.C. 1969), aff'd per
curiam, 421 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1970) (sick pay plan held to be
deferred compensation plan where it entitled the employee to
(Footnote 71 continued
on next column.)
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The hypothetical medical reimbursement plan therefore
is not necessarily a deferred benefit plan. Suppose the
plan by its terms required that all claims for medical
services received in 1987 be filed in time that the claims
could be paid by March 15, 1988. In such a case, no
benefits were deferred more than a brief period beyond
the eni:l of 1987, and section 404 therefore would not
apply. The timing of the employer's deduction would be
governed solely by the all events test, as modified by the
economic performance requirement. For those claims
filed in 1987 under the plan, the fact of liability was then
fixed. The temporary regulations do not specify that
economic performance occurs upon payment in the case
of an unfunded plan not governed by section 404. 72 The
statutory definitions of economic performance should
therefore control: economic performance occurred in
1987 with the performance of services. Accordingly, with
the all events test satisfied and economic performance
having occurred in 1987, the employer should have been

(Footnote 71 continued.)
one week's pay per year when unable to work or upon termination of employment). See also Letter from Calvin H. Johnson to
David Brockway (July 2, 1985) (criticizing vagueness of definition
of "deferred" .(prior to issuance of temporary regulations) and
resultant possibility of planning severely premature accruals),
reprinted in 28 Tax Notes 920 (1985).
Congress gave its stamp of approval to the 2% month period
when, in the Revenue Act of 1987, it repealed IRC sec. 463,
dealing with the accrual of vested vacation pay. See note 47,
supra. No Code section specifically provides for the 2'12 month
grace period. Nevertheless, the committee reports assume that,
without section 463, an employer can deduct vacation pay in the
year earned if it is in fact paid within 2% months of that year's
end. See 1987 Conference Report at 921; S. Rept. No. 63, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 144 (1987) [the 1987 Senate Report].
The temporary regulation merely creates a presumption. If
benefits are provided outside the 2% month period, the employer
may seek to demonstrate that the benefits were nonetheless
provided within a "brief period of time." To rebut the presumption, the employer must show that it was impracticable, either
administratively or economically, to avoid the further deferral
and that, as of the end of the taxable year, the impracticability
was unforeseeable. Temp. Reg. sec. 1.404(b)-1T, A-2(b)(2)
(1986).
"See note 63, supra.
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entitled to a deduction in that year, even if payment was
not made until1988. 73
It may seem perverse that the effect of this analysis is
to permit an employer a deduction, in some circumstances, earlier for an unfunded plan than it would be
entitled for a contribution to a "funded welfare benefit
plan." 74 This shows only that perversity and the Internal
Revenue Code are not mutually exclusive.

This shows only that perversity and the Internal
Revenue Code are not mutually exclusive.
Add another real world assumption. Suppose the plan
did not require that all reimbursements attributable to
1987 medical services be made by March 15, 1988;
perhaps, in the interest of labor harmony, the employer
wished to honor late claims. 75 The plan thus provided
deferred benefits,1 6 but not all of the benefits were deferred. Many claims were in fact paid by the end of the 2%
month period, but others were not. Is the overall medical
reimbursement plan now simply a deferred benefit plan,
so that section 404 governs the timing of deductions for
all reimbursed claims under the plan? Or perhaps the
plan should be bifurcated: those claims for 19137 expenses
paid by March 15, 1988, were potentially deductible in
1987, while claims paid after that date are treated as
deferred benefits, deductible only on payment.
The answer is not totally clear under the temporary
regulations, but it appears either that bifurcation is appropriate77 or, perhaps even more surprising, that each employee should be treated as having his or her own

73 As before, if the recurring items exception applies, it makes
no difference in the result. See text accompanying note 65,
supra. Even if the economic performance requirement need not
be met, the year of deduction remains 1987, when the all events
test was satisfied.
74
See note 53, supra (IRC sec. 419 defers such a deduction
until year of payment to fund).
75
General Dynamics honored claims that were filed substantially later (as much as two years) than required under the terms
of the plans. Joint Appendix at 131, General Dynamics (No.
85-1385).
76 Under these circumstances it does not appear possible to
rebut the presumption that the benefits were paid outside the
"brief period." See note 71, supra. At the end of 1987, it would
have been foreseeable that late payments were to be made. See
note 71, supra.
·
"Bifurcation is supported by the legislative history associated
with the repeal of IRC sec. 463. See notes 47 and 71, supra. The
1987 Conference Report suggests that vested vacation pay not
paid in the year earned should be divided into two components.
For employees in the aggregate, the part of any vacation pay
paid within 2V, months of year's end would be deductible in the
year earned; the rest would become deductible only upon
payment. 1987 Conference Report at 921. Congress viewed this
treatment as exemplifying a more general principle: the reason
for the repeal of section 463 was to eliminate "the disparity in tax
treatment between vacation pay and other deferred benefits."
1987 Senate Report at 144.
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"plan." 78 Under either line of analysis-whether the medical reimbursement scheme is chopped into two pieces or
splintered still further for analytical purposes-the Supreme Court's suggestion is wrong. The self-insurer's
liability for some claims could be deductible prior to the
year of payment, assuming that the reasonable accuracy
of the claimed deductions (the amount of the liability)
can be demonstrated. 7s
Imaginative tax planning did not die with footnote 3 of
General Dynamics. Consistent with its method of accounting,80 a careful taxpayer may still be able modestly
to accelerate deductions associated with unfunded medical reimbursement plans. In light of this analysis, Table 1
outlines the tax treatment of claims arising from medical
services provided in 1987 to employees of a self-insured,
accrual-basis taxpayer that has the calendar year as its
taxable year.

·v.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court did mislead us. Classification of a
liability as an "employee benefit liability" merely begins a
complex analysis, an analysis full of uncertainties. Despite
the Court's implication, economic performance does not
necessarily occur at the time (and for the reason) stated
in footnote 3 in General Dynamics, and the time of
economic performance might well not be a controlling
consideration in any event.
Because of these complexities and uncertainties, the
Court's suggestion in General Dynamics was particularly
inappropriate. The Court prides itself on leaving issues
not before it for another day. The treatment of unfunded
medical reimbursement plans under post-1984 Act law
was an issue that should not have been discussed in the
General Dynamics opinion. By offering gratuitous advice,
the Court demonstrated nothing but the wisdom of its
usual policy of restraint.

78
The temporary regulations provide that "[b]enefits are 'deferred benefits' if, assuming the benefits were cash compensation, such benefits would be considered deferred compensation." Temp. Reg. sec. 1.404(b)-1T, A-2(b)(1) (1986). And the
regulations provide a relevant example of a cash arrangement
whose possible treatment as deferred compensation is determined employee-by-employee:

[S]alary or a year-end bonus received beyond the applicable 2'h month period by one employee shall be presumed to constitute payment under a plan, or method or
arrangement, deferring the receipt of compensation for
such employee even though salary or bonus payments to
all other employees are not similarly treated because they
are received within the 2'h month period.
/d.
79
The amount of liability question did not receive Supreme
Court scrutiny in General Dynamics, although it should have
been examined. See Jensen, supra note 3, at 246-249; Sheppard,
supra note 24, at 340 ("General Dynamics ... appears to be a
reasonable accuracy case decided as a fixed liability case.");
note 58, supra. Without guidance on this point, it is difficult to
know how much further uncertainty the amount of liability issue
will add in the typical real world situation. For those inclined to
take an aggressive stance, it is certainly helpful that General
Dynamics prevailed on this issue in the lower courts. See note
58, supra.
8
°Conforming to the requirements of General Dynamics may
constitute a change in method of accounting for some taxpayers,
and the Secretary of the Treasury's permission may therefore be
required for the change. IRC sec. 446(e).
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